     期刊简介  本期编委 【编译】丁伟航 晋玉 徐一君 缪高意 杨朔 【审校】徐一君 阮含含 阮镇炜 杨朔 赵婧如 【排版】韩心蕊 本期目录 在高度分散的政党体系中建立选举联盟的模式 【题目】A model of electoral alliances in highly fragmented party systems 【作者】Marcelo de C Griebeler，巴西南大河联邦大学；Roberta Carnelos Resende，巴西圣莱奥波尔多的大学 【摘要】高度分散的政党体系由大量政治团体组成，其中许多政治团体在选举联盟的谈判中几乎没有讨价还价的能力。受世界上最支离破碎的巴西体制的启发，我们提供了一种程式化的选举联盟模式，其中有一种竞争小党派支持的模式。两个主要政党试图通过同时提供权力转移(例如政府职位，在其他选举中的支持，威望)来吸引小党派。通过首价密封拍卖的方法，我们可以分析实用主义和意识形态这两种特殊因素在联盟形成中的作用。我们的研究结果表明，在均衡状态下，受欢迎的一方往往比不受欢迎的一方提供更低的转移。此外，领导党派和小党派在意识形态上越接近，转移的金额就越小。当小党派和处于劣势的党派之间的意识形态的紧密程度相对于受欢迎的党派而言足够大时，其效果可能会强大到足以克服受欢迎的党派的选举优势。 Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances. Inspired by the Brazilian system—one of the most fragmented in the world—we provide a stylized model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties. Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach, we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leading and the small parties are in terms of ideology, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough to overcome the electoral advantage of the favorite. 【编译】丁伟航 【审校】徐一君 教育，国家建设与工业化 【题目】Schooling, nation building and industrialization 【作者】Esther Hauk,西班牙巴塞罗那经济学研究生院；Javier Ortega, 英国伦敦金斯顿大学 【摘要】本文采用Gellnerian模型来研究两个地区（two-region state）融合为一个民族国家（a nation state）的过程。工业化要求精英团体为教育提供资金。全国性教育可以促使国家身份认同（national identity）的产生，从而带来跨地区的生产，这是地区性教育所不能实现的。研究表明，当跨地区的生产机会和生产率都处于高水平，特别是当区域和国家的掌权者为同一个精英团体时，全国性教育更受青睐。反之如果跨地区生产机会由全国控制，那么即使是在失去大量这种机会的情况下，占主导地位的地区掌权者仍就可能更偏向实行地区性教育。最后文章通过1860-1920年五个欧洲国家的情况验证了该模型。 We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920. 【编译】晋玉 【审校】阮含含 支持《哈奇法案》：限制官员治活动的可取性 【题目】Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats 【作者】Jean Guillaume Forand 加拿大滑铁卢大学；Gergely Ujhelyi 美国休斯敦大学 【摘要】许多国家对政府工作人员的政治权利进行了限制，这包括对其参加政治活动的限制。这样的限制是否可取？对此本文进行形式利弊分析。官员们的政治活动会影响选民对政府的看法，这可能会带来信息上的好处。然而，这样的活动也可能导致着政策错误，并且容易受到某些官员主观的政治表达情绪的“干扰”。当政治家对下属官员的控制力有限，且能与选民成功协调时，允许官员参加政治活动是可取的。但是，在大多数情况下，禁止其政治活动是最佳选择。 Many countries place restrictions on the political rights of government workers. This includes limitations on political activities such as taking an active part in political campaigns. Are such restrictions desirable? We present a formal welfare analysis of this question. Bureaucrats’ political activities affect voter perceptions of the government and this can have informational benefits. However, they can also induce policy mistakes and are susceptible to ‘noise’ from some bureaucrats’ innate desire for political expression. When politicians have limited control over bureaucrats and successfully coordinate with voters, bureaucrats’ political activities can be desirable. In most cases, however, banning political activities is optimal. 【编译】徐一君 【审校】阮镇炜 多层次政府的稳定性 【题目】The stability of multi-level governments 【作者】Enriqueta Aragone`s，西班牙高等科学研究理事会；Clara Ponsatı´，巴塞罗那经济分析研究院 【摘要】本文研究多层级政府的稳定性。我们分析了领导两级政府的政治家间的广泛形式博弈。我们描述了让多层级政府结构稳定的条件。我们还表明，如果领导人关心选举租金，且不同层级选民的偏好不一致，那么去中心化的政府结构可能是不可持续的。这个结果令人费解，因为从规范的角度看，当不同地区的选民表现出偏好异质性时，通过多层级政府结构进行去中心化决策的最优性正是相关的。 This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity. 【编译】缪高意 【审校】杨朔 集体合作对抗霸权 【题目】Group cooperation against a hegemon 【作者】Guillaume Cheikbossian，蒙彼利埃大学 【摘要】在这篇文章中，笔者研究了公民在重复性的竞赛中合作对抗霸权的能力。在竞赛中中群体成员和霸权对利益有不同的估值。首先，笔者认为群体成员使用严峻触发策略（grim trigger strategies）来支持合作行为，当群体规模增大或利益价值的异质性增加时，群体内部的完全合作更容易以“静止子博弈纳什均衡”(SSPE)的状态维持下来。在另一方面，笔者证明了集团内部的充分合作也可以作为一种脆弱的防重新协商的均衡(weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium)得以维持。然而，群体规模的扩大将增加群体内合作的难度，但群体成员对利益相对估值的增加仍然会促进群体合作。 In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the group can also be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE). However, an increase in group size makes it more difficult to sustain within-group cooperation, but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation. 【编译】杨朔 【审校】赵婧如 好好学习，天天“在看” |
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